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ABSTRACT To facilitate efficient cloud managed resource allocation solutions, collection of key wireless
metrics frommultiple access points (APs) at different locations within a given area is required. In unlicensed
shared spectrum bands collection of metric data can be a challenging task for a cloudmanager as independent
self-interested APs can operate in these bands in the same area. We propose to design an intelligent
crowdsourcing solution that incentivizes independent APs to truthfully measure/report data relating to their
wireless channel utilization (CU). Our work focuses on challenging scenarios where independent APs
can take advantage of recurring patterns in CU data by utilizing distribution aware strategies to obtain
higher reward payments. We design truthful reporting methods that utilize logarithmic and quadratic scoring
rules for reward payments to the APs. We show that when measurement computation costs are considered
then under certain scenarios these scoring rules no longer ensure incentive compatibility. To address this,
we present a novel reward function which incorporates a distribution aware penalty cost that charges APs
for distorting reports based on recurring patterns. Along with synthetic data, we also use real CU data values
crowdsourced using multiple independent measuring/reporting devices deployed by us in the University
of Oulu.
INDEX TERMS Unlicensed spectrum, edge analytics, scoring, crowdsourcing, shared spectrum, real data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of wireless networks to the 5th genera-
tion (5G) and beyond is driven by extremely low-latency
demands, improved throughput requirements and additional
use cases for wireless access, such as connectivity support
for augmented/virtual reality, autonomous robotic systems,
and internet of things [1], [2]. Moreover, the deployment
of 5G and beyondwireless networks is viewed as an evolution
that builds not only on licensed spectrum bands but also on
various unlicensed shared spectrum bands [3].
For the enterprise wireless networks in unlicensed shared
spectrum bands, such as the wireless networks deployed in a
large university campus, an office building, and an airport,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Cesar Vargas-Rosales .
cloud managed network configuration platforms are being
developed for efficient resource utilization [4]. Cloud man-
aged platforms can improve their performance by utilizing
real-time edge analytics of key wireless metrics, such as
wireless channel utilization (CU) [5]. Recent developments
in artificial neural networks (ANN) [6] have encouraged the
industry and the academia to increasingly focus on utilization
of not only instantaneous wireless metric values but also on
the prediction ofmetric values. Predictedmetric values in turn
can be used to enable proactive resource allocation (PRA).
For a resource controller in cloud managed networks,
PRA can be a more challenging task in shared unlicensed
spectrum bands as APs belonging to multiple independent
networks can operate in the same unlicensed channels. For
example, to have sufficiently accurate metric data, collection
of data through crowdsourcing from independent networks
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FIGURE 1. a) and b) Agent’s CU values, c) computed probability distribution, d) monitoring
agent setup.
is also required for ANN design at the resource controller.
However, independent networks can be self-interested and
may tend to report inaccurate metric data which includes
invalid and outdated information [7], as reporting accurate
data requires measuring a metric which involves computa-
tional costs. This is particularly important for cloud managed
solutions utilized for enterprise wireless networks, such as
networks deployed in a large university campus, an office
building, and an airport, where network utilization can often
have recurring patterns. For example, Fig. 1 shows real CU
value data collected for a period of one week in the Tellus area
of the University of Oulu. It can be seen that there is a daily
pattern for weekdays where there is high CU from 8 am to
6 pm and there is less CU usage in other times during the same
days. Moreover, our detailed data collection over the period
of 2 months shows that there are also week days and weekend
patterns in CU utilization. Independent networks operating in
enterprise scenarios can exploit these data patterns to devise
non-truthful reporting strategies which can give them higher
reward payments as compared to when they perform honest
measurements.
In this paper, we present a method that incentivizes mul-
tiple independent APs to truthfully monitor/send spectrum
data, such as their measured CU related values. CU is
defined as a fraction of time a frequency channel is being
used for the transmission by all wireless devices active in
the channel [8]. We study the issue of truthful reporting
of CU data using incentive-compatible methods based on
proper scoring rules, such as logarithmic and quadratic scor-
ing rules. A method is called incentive compatible if all
APs can achieve best reward outcome by honestly measuring
the CU related data values and truthfully reporting them to
the data collection entity. We show that when faced with
measurement computation costs truthful reporting of CU data
under the proper scoring rules may no longer behaviorally
incentive compatible. In fact, we show that when compu-
tation costs of measurements are incorporated, independent
reporting APs (agents) can increase their payoff by distort-
ing the reporting CU data in a particular way. To address
this we present a novel reward function which introduces
a cost measure that takes into account the distortions in
reporting by the APs. In our work, we use not only synthetic
CU data values collected by simulated agents but also use real
CU data values crowdsourced using multiple independent
measuring/reporting devices deployed by us in the University
of Oulu.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows,
1) We design a crowdsourcing scheme which incentivizes
multiple independent APs (agents) operating in unli-
censed shared spectrum to measure/report truthfully
their CU related data to a cloud managed platform.
We focus on eliciting the entire probability distribution
of the measured CU values within the given time interval
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as probability distribution contains much more informa-
tion than the single mean CU value.
2) We consider various information elicitation methods
and evaluate the impact of error using logarithmic and
quadratic scoring rules, which can incentivize agents to
report their true measured CU related data. We use both
synthetic and real CU data in our study. We analyze
the impact of observation errors on logarithmic and
quadratic scoring rules. We provide closed form expres-
sions that quantify the expected difference in reward
between truthful reporting and non-truthful reporting
in the presence of observation errors. We compare the
derived closed-form expressions with the simulations
and show that the values are within 1% of those obtained
from the closed-form expressions.
3) Private/independent agents need to spend their compu-
tational resources to measure the true CU values. CU in
unlicensed spectrum of enterprise wireless networks can
often exhibit recurring patterns (see Fig. 1). We show
that when faced with measurement computation costs
truthful reporting of CU data under the proper scoring
rules may no longer behaviorally incentive compatible.
To address this, we design a reward function which
incorporates a cost measure that penalizes the agents
for distorting their reports based on recurring patterns in
measured data. We show that the proposed reward func-
tion outperforms the logarithmic and quadratic scoring
rules and incentivizes the agents to report true measured
data even under high computation costs.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work. Section III presents our system model.
Section IV presents the information eliciting and probability
scoring methods. Section V presents the distribution aware
reward payment method. In Section VI we provide our con-
cluding remarks and also discuss a possible future direction
for this work.
II. RELATED WORK
Cloud managed wireless networks have attracted strong
interest in the wireless research community because of their
capability to have centralized insights into key network met-
ric data that can help in efficient resource management
decisions [9]. For cloud managed networks in unlicensed
shared spectrum, a technique to improve both overall network
capacity and performance perceived by end users has been
proposed in [10]. To support a variety of virtual network
functions for network flexibility, a cloud managed network
architecture has been proposed in [11].
The works in [10], [12]–[14] have shown that flexible
wireless network monitoring can improve the performance of
a cloud managed wireless network. Wireless network mon-
itoring requires collection and processing of key wireless
metrics related data. To support network monitoring in cloud
managed networks, using crowdsourcing based solutions to
collect wireless metrics data has gained considerable atten-
tion [12], [15]. The works in [12], [15] have highlighted
the opportunities and challenges of using crowdsourcing for
wireless networkmonitoring. In [16], and [17] crowdsourcing
is used to collect network coverage related data, and [18] has
used crowdsourcing for spectrum sensing.
In wireless networks using shared spectrum bands,
it makes sense for a cloud managed wireless operator to
collect data relating to key metrics not only from its own
APs but also use crowdsourcing to collect data from APs
owned by other private networks in the same area. However,
private APs or APs belonging to other networks need to spend
their computation and energy resources to participate in such
a crowdsourcing task. Independent private networks act as
autonomous agents and some incentivemechanism need to be
designed which can motivate them to participate truthfully in
a crowdsourcing task. Various works have proposed the use of
contract theory to design incentive mechanisms for wireless
networks (see [19], and references therein).
A pricing based incentive mechanism for wireless pow-
ered network has been introduced in [20] to maximize the
agent’s utility for honestly reporting its channel gain. In [21],
the authors consider the problem of optimal task assignment
in mobile data crowdsourcing and propose methods that
incentivize strategic workers to truthfully report their private
worker quality and data to the requester. However, none of
these works consider reporting of probability distribution val-
ues and also they ignore the possible exploitation of recurring
patterns in data by the reporting agents.
It is possible that the crowdsourcing requester entity wants
to elicit from the agents a single measured value which is the
mean value of the measurements performed within some time
interval, or it wants to elicit the entire probability distribution
of the measured values within the same time interval as
probability distribution contains much more information than
the single mean value. In Fig. 2, we present a taxonomy of
information eliciting mechanisms used for single value and
probability distribution values elicitation (see [22]). In Fig. 2,
the left branch contains the truth agreement mechanism and
the output agreement mechanism which are utilized when a
single value is required to be elicited. The truth agreement
method considers an ideal scenario in which the requester is
assumed to have access to the ground truth which in general is
not true for wireless networks. The right branch contains the
proper scoring rules, such as the quadratic and the logarithmic
scoring rules, which have been widely utilized for designing
incentive mechanisms where entire probability distribution
is required to be elicited from the strategic agents [23], [24]
and [22]. The quadratic and the logarithmic scoring rules have
been utilized to elicit the whole probability distribution of a
measured value [22].
In this paper, we apply the truthful elicitation mechanisms
to the enterprise network settings where a cloud managed
wireless operator wants the APs to truthfully monitor/send
spectrum data, such as probability distribution of their mea-
sured CU values, and the cloud manager does not have access
to the ground truth. Moreover, different from other existing
works we consider distribution aware selfish APs which can
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FIGURE 2. Classification of information eliciting mechanisms.
save their computation costs associated with the measure-
ments, and instead of measuring and sending the true data
they simply use underlying distributions describing the data
and send that data instead.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cloud-managed wireless network operator
using shared spectrum and has Np number of APs in a given
area each of which are equipped with a radio frequency (RF)
monitoring module. We call these monitoring modules as
peer APs. In the same area, there are Na number of other APs
deployed by independent network owners which also have
RF monitoring modules. We call these monitoring modules
as agent APs. Hence, the total number of APs equipped with
RF monitoring modules is N = Np+Na. Table 1 summarizes
the notations used in this paper.
Measuring only mean values of CU over some time instant
may not be enough in terms of understanding CU behavior,
hence, from each AP, the wireless operator is interested in
eliciting truthful information about probability distribution
of CU values. A single CU value represents the percentage
of time the channel is being used for transmission by the
wireless devices which is generally indicated by a value
between 0% to 100%. Since a wireless channel can be used
by multiple wireless technologies, a CU value indicates the
amount of transmission from multiple wireless devices on a
channel [25].
Histograms are computationally simple way of obtaining
a probability distribution. Over a period of time the peer
and agent APs measure frequency distribution of CU by
constructing histograms of measured CU values, where each
bin of histogram represents a CU state. For a given interval
of t time units, a histogram Ȟi of CU can be given by
Ȟi = {(S1, θ1), (S2, θ2), · · · , (Sk , θk )} (1)
where S1, S2, · · · , Sk represent partitioning of CU values
(ranging from 0 to 100) into k contiguous intervals commonly
known as bins. Each bin in this work represents a CU state.
Each CU state is defined as Sj = [S j; S j) with S j as the
minimum value and S j as themaximumvalue.When a sample
of measured CU value is within some bin (state) Ij then the
counter for that state is incremented by one or else it remains
TABLE 1. Notations used in the paper.
the same. To simplify the model and its analysis, we focus on
a five state CU model: 1) very low CU state denoted by S1
and defined as S1 = [0; 10); 2) low CU state denoted by S2
and defined as S2 = [10; 25); 3) medium CU state denoted
by S3 and defined as S3 = [25; 50); 4) high CU state denoted
by S4 and defined as S4 = [50; 70); and 5) very high CU state
denoted by S5 and defined as S5 = [70; 100]. Let’s denote a
measured CU value at a given time instant t by γ . The count
values for k = 5 CU states are given by θ1, θ2, · · · , θ5, where
2 = (θ1, θ2, . . . .θ5) represents the frequency distribution
of 5 CU states. To convert the obtained frequency distribution
of k = 5 CU states to probability distributions data the cloud
manager simply divides the count values in each state by the
total number of count values in all the 5 states.
In Fig. 3 we illustrate both synthetic and real data collec-
tion models. A snapshot of collected 5 state CU histogram
converted to probability distribution for real data is shown
in Fig. 1c.
A. CU STATE MODEL USING REAL DATA
We use real CU data in our work which we have collected
over a period of almost two months using three indepen-
dent CU measurement devices deployed in the University
of Oulu. One of the utilized CU measurement device is
shown in Fig. 1d. The three devices measure real-time CU in
a 2.4 GHz channel and utilize them to computes the
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FIGURE 3. a) Synthetic data collection setup model b) real data collection setup.
histogram Ȟi. Every t = 22 seconds, each device sends
the histogram Ȟi representing frequency distribution of CU
states to the cloud manager. One of the measurement device
is considered to be worked as peer while the other two
devices are considered to work as agents. The measurement
devices are implemented on Xilinx’s Zynq-7000 system on
chip mounted with RF transceivers. Details regarding the
design and implementation of three measurement devices can
be found in [25].
B. CU STATE MODEL USING SYNTHETIC DATA
Under the synthetic data usage, we consider a data generating
source that at some fixed period outputs a CU value based on
a given probability distribution of five CU states. Each peer
AP and also the agent AP observes the CU value. Both the
peer and the agent can have errors in their observed CU values
and we quantify the error in a measured CU value with error
probability Pe. The histogram Ȟi is constructed using the CU
values and at the end of each interval t , both the peer and the
agent send the histogram Ȟi to the cloud manager.
IV. INFORMATION ELICITATION AND PROBABILITY
SCORING METHODS
We focus on eliciting multiple values scenario in which each
agent and peer is asked to report entire frequency distribu-
tion (θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5) of CU states observed in a given time
interval t by the module. When the agent reports the entire
frequency distribution, we utilize proper scoring rules to
reward the reporting AP agent. A scoring rule is said to be
proper if it is incentive compatible, which means an agent
cannot get higher reward by reporting non-truthful informa-
tion as compared to when it reports truthful information [26].
Fig. 4 illustrates the reporting and reward payment
mechanism.
FIGURE 4. Elicitation of all CU states mechanism.
A Scoring rule provides two-fold functions: it provides
incentive to report truthfully and also allows evaluation of
reporting accuracy. As an incentive mechanism it aims to pay
reward to an agent for reporting the truthful information about
the measured event. As an evaluating mechanism, it esti-
mates the relative accuracy of the agent’s measurements [24].
We use two different proper scoring rules: logarithmic scoring
rule and quadratic scoring rule. The operator pays the reward
to the reporting AP agent based on its reported probability
distribution against the reference peer AP (own AP).
1) QUADRATIC SCORING RULE
In quadratic scoring rule the agent’s payoff is derived from the
sum of squared distance between the reference distribution
and the observed relative distribution [27]. According to this
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rule the reporting AP agent’s payoff is given as
Ri =
k
∑
i=1
ϑi

2φi −
k
∑
j=1
φ2j

 (2)
where ϑi =
θi
∑k
i=1 θi
represents the reference probability of
a CU state i, and φi =
θ̂i
∑k
i=1 θ̂i
represents the measured
probability of a CU state i by agent AP.
2) LOGARITHMIC SCORING RULE
Logarithmic scoring rule is also used to elicit the agent’s
beliefs in terms of subjective probabilities. However, logarith-
mic scoring rule attaches larger penalties than the quadratic
scoring rule [28]. The logarithmic scoring rule deducts for
inaccuracy by adding the natural log of the occurred event’s
probability from the base score [26]. The reward Ri is given
as
Ri =
k
∑
i=1
ϑi (E + lnφi) (3)
where E is the entropy of the prior probability distribution.
Remark 1: The work in [22] has shown that the two proper
scoring rules motivate the APs to report truthfully because
the difference between truthful reporting and non-truthful
reporting is greater than 0 for both logarithmic and quadratic
scoring rules. For the logarithmic rule, this difference is given
as
1R =
k
∑
i=1
ϑi [(E + lnϑi) − (E + lnφi)]
=
k
∑
i=1
ϑi ln(
ϑi
φi
)
= DKL(2‖8) (4)
where Kullback–Leibler divergence DKL(2‖8) ≥ 0 with
equal to 0 when 2 = 8. Hence reporting non-truthfully
can only lower the payoff than reporting it truthfully. For the
quadratic scoring rule, we have
1R =
k
∑
i=1
ϑi

2ϑi −
k
∑
j=1
ϑ2j

−
k
∑
i=1
ϑi

2φi −
k
∑
j=1
φ2j


=
k
∑
i=1
ϑ2i −


k
∑
i=1
2ϑiφi −
k
∑
j=1
φ2j


=
k
∑
i=1
ϑ2i −
(
k
∑
i=1
ϑ2i −
k
∑
i=1
(ϑi − φi)
2
)
=
k
∑
i=1
(ϑi − φi)
2 (5)
which is obviously always>= 0 with equality only if the two
values are equal.
A. OBSERVATION ERRORS AND REWARDS
In practice, CU state observations (measurements) of APs can
have errors.
In our work, for the synthetic data usage case we take into
account the impact of observation errors by considering that
in a given interval t an AP can measure a CU state correctly
with probability Pc < 1. It is important to note that the
real data usage case automatically incorporates measurement
errors as the real measurement sensor used for collecting
data has some but limited errors. The closed form expression
given in Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 will change due to observation
errors and/or for the case where non-truthful values are sent.
For observations with error probability Pe = 1 − Pc, true
measured observation with error is given by
φei = φiPc + (1 − φi)
(
1 − Pc
k − 1
)
(6)
When the AP reports non-truthfully in the presence of obser-
vation errors then φ̂ei is given as
φ̂ei = φ̂iPc + (1 − φ̂i)
(
1 − Pc
k − 1
)
(7)
Under observation with errors case, one can calculate the
expected difference in payoff between truthful reporting and
non-truthful reporting for the logarithmic rule case as:
1R =
k
∑
i=1
φi
[
(E + lnφei
)
− (E + ln φ̂ei )]
=
k
∑
i=1
φi
[(
E + ln
(
φiPc + (1 − φi)
(
1 − Pc
k − 1
)))
−
(
E + ln
(
φ̂iPc +
(
1 − φ̂i
)
(
1 − Pc
k − 1
)))]
=
k
∑
i=1
φiln


φiPc + (1 − φi)
(
1−Pc
k−1
)
φ̂iPc +
(
1 − φ̂i
) (
1−Pc
k−1
)

 (8)
The expected difference in payoff between truthful report-
ing and non-truthful reporting for the quadratic rule case can
be calculated as:
1R =
k
∑
i=1
φei
(
2(φei − φ̂
e
i )
)
−
k
∑
j=1
(
φe
2
j − φ̂
e2
j
)
=
k
∑
i=1
2φe
2
i −
k
∑
i=1
2φe
2
i φ̂
e2
i −
k
∑
i=1
φe
2
i +
k
∑
i=1
φ̂e
2
i
=
k
∑
i=1
(φe
2
i − 2φ
e2
i φ̂
e2
i + φ̂
e2
i )
=
k
∑
i=1
(φe
2
i − φ̂
e2
i )
2
=
k
∑
i=1
[(
φiPc + (1 − φi)
(
1 − Pc
k − 1
))
−
(
φ̂iPc +
(
1 − φ̂i
)
(
1 − Pc
k − 1
))]2
(9)
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In Section IV-C, we will verify the average reward results
for Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 given by the closed-form expression
we derived in Eq. 6 by comparing them with the estimated
average reward from a Monte Carlo simulation.
B. COMPUTATION COST
An RF module in an AP requires processing of in-phase and
quadrature (IQ) samples to obtain in real-time CU related
statistics. In such an RF monitoring system, there is more
computational cost associated with higher bandwidth. This
is due to the higher sampling rate required for processing
the IQ samples. For example, monitoring a 2 MHz channel
requires sampling rate of 4 Msamples/s, whereas a 20 MHz
channel requires sampling rate of 40 Msamples/s to satisfy
the Nyquist sampling rate. As a result, it is possible that
when the computation cost in monitoring are taken into
account, an AP agent can increase its reward Ri by saving the
computational cost. In such a scenario, it is not favourable
for a reporting AP agent to perform computation for each
given interval t and report truthfully. In order to evaluate the
effect of computational cost on AP agent’s reward based on
logarithmic and quadratic scoring rules, we present agent’s
reward for both the cases i.e., with and without considering
the computational cost.
The reward with the computation cost is given as
Rc,i = RiVr − Cσ (10)
where Ri represents the AP agent’s reward using the scoring
rules, Vr represents the value of monitoring reward per unit
which is in some digital monetary unit, such as a bitcoin,
C represents the amount of computation done to process
CU data samples for a given channel bandwidth in a given
interval. σ represents the cost of computation per unit (where
1 unit represents computation of 1 MHz channel bandwidth).
In reality this cost is due to energy consumption and the use
of more RF monitoring resources for IQ sample processing
which is again in some digital monetary unit, such as bitcoin.
Note that when σ = 0 this means that there is no computation
cost per unit.
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the prob-
ability scoring methods using synthetic data and APs with
noisy measurements and also with and without computation
cost. Table 2 presents the simulation parameters and values
for synthetic data.
TABLE 2. Simulation parameters and values for synthetic data.
1) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION USING
THE SYNTHETIC DATA
We consider the scenarios where the AP is asked to report the
probability distribution (θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5), and the probability
scoring method using quadratic scoring rule and logarithmic
scoring rule presented in the previous subsections are utilized.
In Fig. 5, we plot the average reward per round for an AP as a
function of probability of correct measurement. We compare
the average reward results for Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 given by the
closed-form expression we derived in Eq. 6 and the estimated
average reward from a Monte Carlo simulation. Some of the
results are also tabulated in Table 3. Observe that the rewards
estimated from Monte-Carlo simulations are within 1% of
those obtained by applying Eq. 6 in Eq. 2 and Eq. 3.
TABLE 3. Agent’s reward at different Pc .
FIGURE 5. Scoring rules simulation vs theoretical graph.
2) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION USING THE REAL DATA
Next we present the results using the real data which has
been collected in one of the busiest places in the university
of Oulu and data collection details are given in section III-A.
It can be seen from Fig. 1a that real measured data shows
fluctuation in CU values. In general, filtering is used to
compensate for fluctuations in real data. To take this account,
we will also evaluate the impact on average reward when
filtering, such as moving average filtering, is utilized on
the real CU data. We compared the three different reporting
strategies.
Strategy1 Agent reports the true observed entire frequency
distribution (θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5) of the CU states every
time interval t = 22 seconds for the thirteen days
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and gets the reward Ri in each round of reporting
using the probabilistic scoring method. We call
this as the honest reporting strategy.
Strategy2 Agent reports the true observed entire frequency
distribution (θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5) of the CU states every
time interval t = 22 seconds for the first 24 hours
of the day. To save the computation cost in the
other 12 days, the agent instead of performing
real monitoring reports sends the same frequency
distributions that was measured for the same time
interval t of the first day. For example, at the
time interval t of the day two the agent reports
the frequency distribution (θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5) mea-
sured at the same time of the day 1 and so on.
We call this as the simple dishonest reporting
strategy.
Strategy3 Since if the agent is sending the same data during
the same time of all the remaining days, it is easily
detectable. To avoid easy detection, we consider
the third strategy. In this strategy, first just like
the simple dishonest strategy the agent reports
the true observed entire frequency distribution
(θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5) of the CU states every time inter-
val t = 22 seconds for the first 24 hours of the
day. However, to save the computation cost in the
other 12 days, the agent instead of sending same
data as monitoring reports it generates data based
on the distribution of the first day data and sends
that data as the monitoring reports. For example,
for day 2 and onwards the agents uses the data
of day 1 to find the distribution for the particu-
lar interval, generates (θ1, θ2, . . . ., θ5) of the CU
states using that distribution and sends this as the
monitoring report. We call this as the distribution-
based dishonest reporting strategy.
a: AVERAGE REWARD UNDER THE THREE STRATEGIES AND
THE IMPACT OF DATA FILTERING
In Fig. 6, we evaluate the average reward performance for
the three strategies under the probabilistic scoring method.
In the figure, we present the average reward as a function of
moving mean window (Mw). The Mw represents a parameter
for the moving average filter utilized on the CU data, where
each mean is calculated over a sliding window of length Mw
across neighboring elements of CU data vector. Note that
Mw = 1 means no moving average filter is utilized on the
data and Mw = 3 means moving average filter of length is
utilized. It can be seen from the figure that for the honest
reporting strategy use of moving average filter with Mw = 3
can increase the agents reward by almost 17%. It can be
also seen from the figure that the honest reporting strategy
results in the highest average reward as compared to the
other two dishonest reporting strategies. Moreover, the fig-
ure also shows that for the two dishonest reporting strategies
there is little impact on using filtering over their reported
data.
FIGURE 6. Agent reward as a function of moving average filter
window Mw .
b: AVERAGE REWARD UNDER THE THREE STRATEGIES AND
THE IMPACT OF COMPUTATION COST
In order to evaluate the impact of computation cost
(see Eq. 10) on the reward performance, we calculated ρR as a
function of increasing computation cost, where ρR is the ratio
of agent’s reward when it is honestly reporting to the agent’s
reward when it reports dishonestly. To evaluate the impact of
computation cost Cσ we first set σ = 0 which represents the
case where there is no computation cost assumed. For model-
ing Cσ > 0, we fix the value of cost per unit σ to be greater
than 0 and increase C . Fig. 7 presents these results for the
case when no filtering is performed on the monitoring reports
and Fig. 8 shows the results when filtering is performed
on the monitoring reports. In the figures, computation cost
0.05 means that an agent is required to measure a 2.8 MHz
channel whereas the maximum computation cost 0.35 means
that the agent is required to measure a 20 MHz channel. The
two figures show that as the cost of computation is increased
the ratio ρR decreases and it can go below 1 for a 20 MHz
channel which means that the agents have incentive to use the
dishonest reporting strategies as they can result in either equal
or higher rewards than the honest reporting strategies. The
reason for this can be explained as follows: For the strategy 1,
since each agent is exerting effort everyday in monitoring so
there is always a computational cost. However, in the other
two strategies each agent is reporting according to the day 1
distribution so there is computational cost for monitoring
during day 1 but there is no monitoring computational cost in
the other days. It can be also seen from the two figures that the
quadratic scoring leads to smaller ρR as compared to the log-
arithmic rule. This means that under computation cost taken
into account when the quadratic scoring rule is utilized then
the agents have more incentive to follow the two dishonest
strategies for reporting.
V. DISTRIBUTION AWARE REWARD PAYMENTS
To discourage the agents using the past data distribution in
their future reports we introduce a novel distribution aware
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FIGURE 7. Average reward under three strategies without moving
average filter.
FIGURE 8. Average reward under three strategies with moving average
filter with window length 15.
cost function which takes into account changes in underly-
ing data distributions over time. The basic idea behind this
new cost function is that the requesting operator performs
computations which measure the changes overtime in the
probability distribution of CU data. The cost function utilizes
basic property of reporting data from the multiple AP agents
and the own peer AP which is: Although the peer and agents
perform independent measurements but they measure the
same process (CU in a channel) which means that although
their reports can be different from each other for a given
interval but their distribution cannot differ widely from each
other. The idea is that if the AP agent reports based on some
previous day’s data its reporting distribution is likely to differ
more with the peer AP’s reporting distribution as compared
to if the AP agent reports real measured data.
A. EMD BASED DISTRIBUTION AWARENESS
We propose to use a statistical distance based technique
called earth mover’s distance (EMD) to create distribution
awareness. In simple words, EMD can be defined as the
minimum amount of effort needed to transform a proba-
bility distribution α (which represents the CU probability
distribution at time t) towards probability distribution β
(which represents the CU probability distribution at
time t́). The effort can be defined in simple words as:
effort = (number of normalized CU count values moved) ×
(number of bins over which they are moved). Simply put,
the idea of EMD is to imagine two probability distributions
as piles of dirt and calculate the minimum amount of effort
needed to reshape the first pile so that it has the same shape as
the second pile. The important feature of EMD is that it takes
into account distance. With increasing dissimilarity of two
CU distributions the EMD increases because the probabilities
need to be moved over larger number of bins (distances).
We confirm this claim by showing results in the subsequent
paragraphs but first we explain how the EMD is computed.
In our work, EMD is computed by calculating the difference
between the two cumulative CU histograms Ĥj and Ĥm.
A cumulative histogram can be defined as a mapping that
counts the cumulative number of observations in all of the
bins up to the specific bin. The cumulative histogram 9(Ĥi)
of a histogram Ĥi is defined as
9i(Ĥj) =
i
∑
j=1
Ĥj (11)
The EMD between the two cumulative histograms Ĥj and Ĥm
can be represented as
δ =
k
∑
i=1
|9i(Ĥj) − 9i(Ĥm)| (12)
where k = 5 for the five CU states.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we present box plots of EMD values
showing CU distribution differences between the different
reporting strategies using the real CU dataset. Fig. 9 shows
the results for reports without filtering and Fig. 10 shows
the results when filtering is performed on the reports.
Tables 4 and 5 show median, minimum and maximum
EMD values between the different reporting strategies with
TABLE 4. Distance between the histogram bins without moving average
filter.
TABLE 5. Distance between the histogram bins with moving average filter.
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FIGURE 9. EMD box plot under three strategies without moving average
filter.
FIGURE 10. EMD box plot under three strategies with moving average
filter.
and without filtering. Strategy 1 means the EMD is calcu-
lated between the peer AP reports and the AP agent sending
honestly measured reports; Strategy 2 means the EMD is
calculated between the peer AP reports and AP agent sending
dishonest reports using the simple dishonest strategy; and
Strategy 3 means the EMD is calculated between the peer
AP reports and the AP agent sending dishonest reports using
the distribution-based dishonest strategy. It can be seen from
Fig. 9 and Table 4 that for Strategy 1 while the median value
(red line in the box) is 0.2, however, for Strategy 2 and
Strategy 3 median values have slightly increased to 0.23 and
0.26, respectively. The figure also shows that the 75th per-
centile values (top edges of the boxes) have almost doubled
for the dishonest reporting strategies. The whiskers in the
figure extend to the most extreme data points not considered
outliers, the outliers are plotted using the ‘+’ symbol. It can
be seen from the figure that both the outliers and the whiskers
for the dishonest strategies have higher values than the honest
reporting. The impact of using filtering on the EMD values is
presented in Fig. 10 and Table 5. It can be seen that filtering
reduces EMD values for Strategy 1 much more significantly
as compared to EMD values for the two dishonest reporting
strategies.
Algorithm 1 EMD Based Distribution Aware Reward
Cloud Manager Part
Data: Input CU data from a peer AP i and from each
agent AP j represented by Ĥi and Ĥj, respectively
where Ĥi = {(S1, θ1), (S2, θ2), · · · , (Sk , θk )}
// same for Ĥj
Obtain prob dist: 8i =
θ1,θ2,...,θk
∑k
n=1 θn
// same step for 8j
Penalty cost: δ = EMD(8i, 8j)
Calculate accuracy: if(scoring_rule = logarithmic)
L(φi, i)
else
Q(φi, i)
end
Calculate reward payment: Rp,i using Eq 13
AP Agent Part
Check strategy:
if (strategy = 1)
Report true 2 at each instance t
elseif (strategy = 2)
if (Day = 1)
Report and store true 2 at each instance t
else
Report 2 measured at the same instance t of the
day 1
end
elseif (strategy = 3)
if (Day = 1)
Report and store true 2 at each instance t
else
Report 2 value generated at time instance t based
on the distribution of the day 1 data
end
end
B. EMD BASED PENALTY COST
To discourage the dishonest reporting which leads to compu-
tation savings and in turn can lead to higher reward value is
given in Eq. 10, we use differences in EMD values between
the peer AP and the agent AP reports exceeding some thresh-
old value τ as a penalty cost. The reward obtained by an agent
is then given as
Rp,i =
{
Rc,i − δ, δ > τ
Rc,i, otherwise
(13)
In other words, if the EMD between the peer AP and the agent
AP reports exceed some threshold τ then the agent AP incurs
cost penalty equal to the EMD value δ given in Eq. 12.We use
median EMD value as τ which means that the agent AP
incurs cost penalty when the EMDvalue between the reported
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CUdistribution by the peer AP and the agent AP exceeds their
median EMD value calculated for the past 24 hours.
To evaluate the impact of penalty cost on the reward per-
formance, we calculate ρR as a function of increasing com-
putation cost, where ρR is the ratio of agent’s reward when
it is honestly reporting to the agent’s reward when it reports
dishonestly. Fig. 11 presents these results for the strategies
when no filtering is performed on the monitoring reports
and Fig. 12 shows the results when filtering is performed
on the monitoring reports. The two figures show that the
introduced penalty cost increases the ρR as compared to the
results in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 when there was no penalty cost in
the reward payment. This means that the penalty cost allows
an agent to get relatively more reward for honest reporting
as compared to when it uses a dishonest reporting strategy.
Moreover, the two figures, Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 also show
that even for high computation cost of 0.35 the ρR for all
the scenarios and both quadratic and logarithmic scoring
rules is well above 1. This means that the AP agent can
achieve the best reward outcome for itself just by honestly
reporting. This is different than when there was no penalty
FIGURE 11. EMD based average reward without moving average filter.
FIGURE 12. EMD based average reward with moving average filter with
window length 15.
cost was introduced in the reward payment as then the ρR was
below 1 meaning more incentive to follow the two dishonest
strategies for reporting.
Fig. 11 shows the ratio of agent’s utility by considering a
new cost function or the penalty associated with the distance
between the ground truth and agent reported histograms.
In Fig. 11 the threshold τ = 0.2 which is the median of the
distance between the histogram of ground truth and agent for
Strategy 1 i.e, honest reporting without movmean (Table 4).
If the distance between the histogram of ground truth and
agent at interval t is greater than the threshold then cost or
the penalty in Eq. 13 occurs. This cost is incurred in order to
force agent to exert effort and send the true information about
the CU state to the controller.
Fig. 11 shows that the for both the scoring rules the agent’s
utility for honest strategy has been improved as compared to
Fig. 7. Unlike Fig. 7 for the logarithmic scoring rule the ratios
between the honest and dishonest reporting is always higher
than 1. Moreover, for quadratic scoring rule almost at double
cost the ratio is higher than 1, which means that proposed
penalty in Eq. 13 improves the agent’s utility for honest
strategy as compare to Fig. 7. This is because whenever the
agent is dishonest, cost or the penalty in Eq. 13 occurs which
motivates agent to report the true information about CU state.
In Fig. 12, τ = 0.18218 which is the median of the
distance between the histogram of ground truth and agent for
Strategy 1 i.e, honest reportingwithmovmean (Table 5). If the
measured distance between the histogram of ground truth and
agent at interval t is greater than the threshold then cost in
Eq. 13 occurs.
Fig. 12 shows that for both the scoring rules the agent’s
utility for honest strategy is highest. Unlike Fig. 8 which only
considers the computation cost, by considering the penalty
for agent’s reported information the agent’s utility for honest
strategy has been improved. Furthermore, the ratio between
the Strategy 1 and Strategy 2 is less than the ratio between
the Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 for both the scoring rules. This
is because with filtering the distance between the ground
truth and agent’s histogram improves more for Strategy 2
than the Strategy 3 and hence the agent’s utility improves for
Strategy 2.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTION
We design a crowdsourcing solution to incentivize indepen-
dent wireless networks to truthfully measure/send their CU
data samples to a cloud managed wireless operator. We have
utilized both synthetic and real crowdsourced CU data col-
lected through multiple independent measuring/reporting
devices deployed in the University of Oulu. We show that
the real wireless CU in an enterprise network shows recur-
ring patterns which can be exploited by independent access
points (APs) to devise non-truthful reporting strategies that
can save their measurement computation costs and obtain
higher rewards as compared to truthful measurements and
reporting. In our work, we use proper scoring rules to reward
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the reporting AP agents. We evaluate the performance of the
scoring rules under the CU measurement errors and provide
closed-form expressions that quantify their performance loss
due to measurement errors. We also show that when AP
agents computation costs are taken into account then the
proper scoring rules are no longer behaviorally incentive
compatible under high computation costs. To address this we
incorporate a distribution aware penalty cost in the reward
payments to the agent AP. We show that the new reward pay-
ment scheme performs better and enables truthful reporting
of CU data even under high computation costs. In order to
compensate the fluctuations in real data we also evaluate our
results with and without moving average filter and results
show improved performance for the proposed mechanism
when filtering is used.
In our future work, we intend to use a game-theoretic
model to study the strategic interactions between the cloud
manager and the independent AP agents for crowdsourcing of
wireless data which exhibits recurring patterns over a period
of time. Another possible future work in this area can include
the implementation of the proposed incentive mechanism
to monitor/measure the wide range of key wireless metric
information, such as interference, power etc.
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